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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
\7" ' 
V . i 
MICHAEL S. WEAVER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 20070136-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his sentence for possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Can defendant demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel where his 
claim rests solely on vague and unsubstantiated allegations made in a 
post-judgment letter to the trial court? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal is 
reviewed as a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^  6, 89 P.3d 162. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Arm. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On or about April 1, 2005, two police officers were dispatched to defendant's 
residence to execute an arrest warrant (R. 39-40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). The defendant was 
in his vehicle; his four-year-old son was in the back seat (R. 40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). One 
of the officers removed the child from defendant's vehicle (R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). Although 
defendant remained uncooperative, he was eventually moved into the other officer's 
vehicle (Id). In a subsequent search of defendant's vehicle, officers found a glass pipe 
and a plastic container with white powder in a jacket next to where the child had been 
sitting (R. 39-40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). Both the pipe and powder tested positive for 
methamphetamine (R. 40; R. 2041 (PSI at 6)). In a fanny pack in the front area of the 
vehicle, the officers found another glass pipe and a sharp kitchen knife (R. 39-40; R. 2041 
(PSI at 6)). Defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony (R. 40). 
Defendant was charged by amended information with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony; endangerment of a 
child, a third degree felony; possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
third degree felony; and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
]Because defendant's conviction was based on a guilty plea, not a trial, the facts of 
the case are taken from the Information and defendant's presentence investigation report 
(PSI). 
2 
misdemeanor (R. 38-40). Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and was bound over 
on all charges (R. 41-43). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain covering multiple criminal cases against him, defendant 
pleaded guilty to four charges, including the possession of a dangerous weapon charge in 
this case (R. 152, 154-60). The remaining charges against defendant were dismissed 
(Id).2 
A sentencing hearing in this case was held on January 12, 2007 (R. 207 (transcript 
attached at Addendum B)). At the beginning of the hearing, defense counsel presented 
the court with letters from defendant's work and sister (R. 207:37). The court then heard 
from defense counsel, defendant, and a mental health counselor with whom defendant 
had been working, all of whom argued for leniency for defendant (R. 207:37-58). Neither 
2In addition to the charges in this case, the plea agreement covered charges in three 
other cases. In case 051907570, defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful 
possession of a financial card, a third degree felony; and one count each of burglary, a 
second degree felony; unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony; forgery, a third degree felony; possession of another's ID documents, a third 
degree felony; and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor 
(R. 2041 (PSI at 5)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the forgery 
and burglary charges, and the remaining charges were dismissed (Id.). 
In case 051907618, defendant was charged with assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony, and attempted damage to jails, a class A misdemeanor (Id.) Pursuant to the 
plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the assault by a prisoner charge, and the 
remaining charge was dismissed (Id. at 6). 
In case 051903146, defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree felony, 
and driving without insurance, a class B misdemeanor (Id. at 5). Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, these charges were dismissed (Id.). 
3 
defendant nor his counsel, however, objected to defendant's PSI or claimed that 
inaccuracies existed therein (Id). 
On January 16, 2007, the trial court entered a final judgment sentencing defendant 
to the statutory term of 0-to-5 years on the weapons charge (R. 164-65). The court 
ordered that defendant's sentence run consecutive to his sentences in the other cases (Id.). 
On January 22, 2007, the trial court received a letter from defendant claiming that 
his presentence investigation report "is full of errors and very negative which I asked [my 
defense counsel] to address but never happened" (R. 166). 
On February 8, 2007, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 169). Following 
a temporary remand by this Court, new defense counsel was appointed (R. 203). 
Before filing his opening brief, defendant moved this Court for a remand under 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to establish facts necessary to support an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim (Def. Rule 23B Motion) (attached at Addendum 
C)). The State opposed defendant's motion on the ground that it was based solely by 
unsworn allegations in a docketing statement, and, thus, failed to allege any specific 
nonspeculative facts warranting a remand (State's Response to Rule 23B Motion 
(attached at Addendum C)). This Court denied the motion, stating that defendant had 
"not alleged specific nonspeculative facts warranting remand" (Order dated October 9, 
2007 (attached at Addendum C)). 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at 
sentencing by failing to raise inaccuracies in defendant's presentence investigation report 
(PSI). Defendant's claim fails for lack of record support. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show 
both that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
deficient performance. The claim must allege specific acts or omissions by counsel that 
were deficient and prejudicial. The claim cannot be based on unsubstantiated or 
speculative allegations. 
Here, the only record evidence supporting defendant's claim is a post-judgment 
letter to the trial court in which defendant alleges inaccuracies in his PSI and claims to 
have asked his counsel to raise those inaccuracies at sentencing. Defendant's letter, 
however, fails to identify any specific inaccuracies in the PSI. It also fails to present any 
evidence, other than defendant's self-serving allegation, that defense counsel was aware 
of those alleged inaccuracies prior to sentencing. The letter's allegations, therefore, are 
both vague and unsubstantiated. As such, they do not support an ineffective assistance 
claim. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT CANNOT DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE HIS CLAIM RESTS SOLELY 
ON VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS MADE IN 
A POST-JUDGMENT LETTER TO THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel "performed ineffectively in failing to bring 
errors in the presentence report to the attention of the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 5 
(capitalization and underlining omitted). According to defendant, "counsel performed 
deficiently because, on behalf of her client, she did not bring errors in the presentence 
report [] to the trial court's attention." Id. And, according to defendant, counsel's 
performance was prejudicial because it is "possible that resolution of the inaccuracies in 
his presentence investigation report could have led to different, and more favorable, 
sentencing terms." Id. at 7. Defendant's claim fails because the record is inadequate to 
support it. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
To establish the first prong of the Stricklandlest, defendant must identify the "specific 
acts or omissions of counsel" that he claims "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ^ 45, 154 P.3d 788. He must then "rebut 
6 
the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Powell, 2007 UT 9, f^ 46. To establish the second 
prong, defendant must affirmatively show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 45 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In all cases, 
"proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993); see also State 
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) ("Neither speculative claims nor counsel's failure 
to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance of counsel"). 
Moreover, in any ineffectiveness claim, "defendant bears the burden of assuring 
the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. Thus, "[i]f a defendant is aware 
of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, 
which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. 
P. 23B, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary 
remand." Id. "The necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will 
presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the 
relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id.dX\\l. "Where the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
1 
In this case, defendant's claim rests on his contention that he "told his trial counsel 
about factual errors or omissions in his presentence report" prior to sentencing and that 
his counsel "failed to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court." Aplt. Br. at 4. 
However, the only support for defendant's contention is a post-judgment letter he sent to 
the trial court, id. at 3 (citing R. 166), and a docketing statement filed in a different 
appellate case, id. at 2 & Addendum D (citing docketing statement filed in case no. 
20070158-CA). Those documents are insufficient to prevail on an ineffective assistance 
claim. 
First, defendant's self-serving letter to the trial court states only that "the Pre 
Sentence report is full of errors and very negative which I asked [defense counsel] to 
address but never happened" (R. 166). The letter neither identifies with any specificity 
the exact nature of the errors alleged, nor establishes as a matter of fact that defendant 
informed defense counsel of those errors before sentencing. Moreover, because the 
assertions in the letter were not given under oath or tested in cross-examination, they are 
not evidence. The letter, therefore, does not support an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (rejecting ineffective 
assistance claim "based almost entirely on self-serving affidavits that are not part of the 
record"); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that defendant 
"cannot rely upon . . . unsubstantiated allegations on appeal as proof of ineffective 
8 
assistance of counsel"); State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 265 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting 
ineffectiveness claim based solely on "defendant's self-serving statement"). 
Second, although defendant cites a docketing statement and attaches the docketing 
statement to his brief, see Aplt. Br. at 2 & Addendum D, the docketing statement was 
filed in a different appellate case and, in any case, is not part of the record on appeal. See 
Aplt. Br. at Addendum D (indicating docketing statement was filed in case number 
20070158-CA). Thus, defendant's reliance on it is misplaced. See Medina, 738 P.2d at 
1023 (noting that "references to matters outside the record will not be considered" on 
appeal") (citing State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986)); Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 
290 (holding that appellate court "do[es] not consider new evidence on appeal"). 
Furthermore, the docketing statement only alleges that the PSI is "not accurate and 
very bias" because it did not contain information concerning his alleged conversation 
with an Adult Probation and Parole officer or his alleged rehabilitation efforts. Aplt. Br. 
at Addendum D. Like the letter defendant wrote to the trial court, however, the 
allegations in the docketing statement are both vague and unsubstantiated. See id. Those 
vague and unsubstantiated allegations were insufficient to warrant a rule 23B in this case. 
See Order dated October 9, 2007 (denying defendant's rule 23B remand based on 
allegations in same docketing statement because defendant had "not alleged specific 
nonspeculative facts warranting a remand"). They are also insufficient to support an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023; Bredehoft, 966 
9 
P.2d at 290; Price, 909 P.2d at 265; see also Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877; Chacon, 962 
P.2dat51. 
Finally, as a matter of clarification, the State notes that defendant cites a prior case 
involving him as a defendant in which the State conceded that a remand was required to 
address alleged inaccuracies in a PSI. See Aplt. Br. at 7-8 (citing State v. Weaver, 2007 
UT App 229U). That case, however, both preceded all of the four cases resolved by 
defendant's current pleas and involved a different PSI. See Weaver, 2007 UT App 229U 
(attached at Addendum D); see also Aple. Br. in case no. 20060482-CA (attached at 
Addendum D). Thus, a remand in that case in no way supports a similar remand in this 
case. 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED (J_ February 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
5 76 -10 -503 . Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and owner-
ship of dangerous weapons by certain persons 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 
76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101; 
or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as 
defined in Section 76-3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and 
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony 
offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993),1 or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or1 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the 
United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, u!$e, or have under 
his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, 
or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same 
time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in 
another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Su-
pervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms 
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension— 
Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or 
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in 
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court 
is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services 
shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to' cqnduct 
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the 
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with 
department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for 
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or informa-
tion from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement accord-
ing to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim 
and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's 
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for 
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may 
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall 
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information 
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record 
and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on 
probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to^he court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of eledtronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensa-
tory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed 
on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in 
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 
77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and 
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, 
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case "and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer respon-
sibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay 
should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination 
of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerat-
ed at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revoca-* 
tion of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance 
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the 
conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a iinamg mat 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine 
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing, 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented 
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent, 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the 
court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the s'efitence previous-
ly imposed shall be executed. 
, (13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition 
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or 
his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records 
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department 
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report 
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall 
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim* to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance 
with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitor-
ing only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
directly or by contract with a private provider. 
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5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Are we ready? 
7 MS. VIERA: We're ready, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Weaver? 
9 DEFENDANT: Well, yes, sir. 
10 MS. VIERA: Your Honor, I do have two letters. One 
11 from Mr. Weaver's work and the other from his sister, if I 
12 may approach? 
13 THE COURT: Absolutely. You've also had a chance to 
14 review the Pre-Sentence Report? 
15 MS. VIERA: Yes, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
17 MS. VIERA: Your Honor, Dr. Deuso is also here and 
18 would like to speak with the Court regarding Mr. Weaver as 
19 well. 
20 Your Honor, the recommendation of AP&P I think is 
21 not unexpected. Before Mr. Weaver entered his plea I had 
22 talked with AP&P and spoke with Troy Staker, Mr. Weaver's 
23 probation agent, regarding Mr. Weaver and what AP&P was 
24 likely to do. At that time he had informed me that he was 
25 J more geared toward rehabilitation and unfortunately, I think, 
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1 Mr. Weaver's past is something that he felt that he could not 
2 overlook. 
3 Mr. Weaver, however, cannot wipe out his past and 
4 he certainly cannot change how he was raised and the paths 
5 that led him to where he is today. What he can do, Your 
6 Honor, is simply change what he's currently doing and what he 
7 can be in the future. And in the past, at least, three years 
8 he has been working toward doing that. His record is what it 
9 is, but he is now 52 years old, and since 2002 he has 
10 successfully completed probation. He went on probation for 
11 two years and successfully completed that, and since 2005 he 
12 has been clean. He hasn't had any new crimes, and he has 
13 (inaudible) with the Court compliant and coming to Court is 
14 required in (inaudible) of his cases, and further, that he 
15 has been on probation now with AP&P on the matter in Davis 
16 County without violation. 
17 He has - his current history and what he's been 
18 (inaudible) shows three things which presented Mr. Weaver to 
19 be successful and that is that he had a goal in mind, he had 
20 a focus that he wanted to get to and he had supervision. His 
21 goal has been, and I think you know this very well, his 
22 children. He has two small children that were placed with 
23 him after being abandoned by their mother, and he has worked 
24 very hard to maintain his ability to father them. He hasn't 
25 I been successful in all ways, he has been extremely successful 
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1 in others. He loves his children. He wants what's best for 
2 them. He's worked with DCFS, sometimes successfully, to get 
3 the ability to parent them and he has been granted that 
4 ability to parent them (inaudible) time. That is now his 
5 current goals/focus. 
6 In August of 2005 - 2006, his right to parent his 
7 children was terminated. He is now working to, on an appeal 
8 to try and get those children back. Whether or not he will 
9 ultimately be successful of that will be up to another court. 
10 But as things stand now, that still remains his goal and his 
11 focus, and I believe that that is what will get him the 
12 ability to succeed. What it will give him is the time that 
13 he needs to become, quite frankly, someone better than he was 
14 before. And in the past three years, that is what he has 
15 been working toward. What he has done in the time that he 
16 has been out and the past 15 months when these cases have 
17 been pending is to attend, on his own initiative, and without 
18 cost based upon services that he provides in repayment for 
19 the treatment that he receives from Dr. Deuso. He goes to 
20 him regularly, has a very important mainstay in his life, has 
21 a very important (inaudible) for him when he becomes 
22 (inaudible) trouble. 
23 He has repeatedly come to my office asking me, 
24 again, is there anything more that I can do, is there 
2 5 J anything more that I can show to prove that I can be 
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1 successful, to prove to you, Judge Himonas, that he will be a 
2 better person than he has been before. And those are the 
3 focuses that have kept him going the past 15 months. He has 
4 come to Court knowing what he was charged with, knowing the 
5 likely consequences of what would happen to him and he has 
6 always come to Court, he has always done what was required of 
7 him and he has always done what he said he would do. That, I 
8 think, has been the most impressive thing about him in regard 
9 to my feelings with him. 
10 He has in a time received treatment for the drug 
11 problem. He's received treatment for his behavioral issues. 
12 He's been compliant with the, all court and lawyer requests. 
13 He is focused on what he needs to do with this Court, with 
14 the juvenile court, with the juvenile judge, with the court 
15 in Davis County and also with my request upon him as to what 
16 he needed to do to make sure that he stayed out, stayed clean 
17 and stayed compliant. 
18 Ultimately, what we have been trying to accomplish 
19 in a very short period of time is his rehabilitation. Mr. 
20 Weaver has been in and out of prison since he was, quite 
21 frankly 12 years old. He went to 12 years old into State 
22 custody and in 1994 was the termination of his last prison 
23 commitment. From that time, 12 years ago, he has remained 
24 out of prison. He hasn't been without crimes during that 
25 I time and we're here because of that. But what he has done is 
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1 tried to, tried to become a different person. And the reason 
2 that he did this, the ability to do this I think was, quite 
3 frankly, a consequence, a devastating consequence to him of 
4 losing his children. Mr. Weaver is not ever going to be 
5 completely rehabilitated. He, quite frankly, has been a long-
6 term career criminal for all, most all of his life. It 
7 happened when he was left home at the age of 10 and was in 
8 the court system by the age of 12. But in the time that he 
9 has been out this most recently and from 2002, he has 
10 accomplished a great deal to overcome a substantial time 
11 period and substantial deficit in his criminal thinking, in 
12 his lack of taking responsibility and in his avoidance of 
13 problems, his impulsive - impulsivity, which is a great deal 
14 of his criminal behavior and thinking. That's something that 
15 isn't worked through time, he's not ever going to be, his 
16 first impulse isn't ever going to be the right one, but what 
17 it will do is give him the time to pause, to think and to 
18 think about the consequences of his actions on other people, 
19 and that is something that he has been successfully thinking 
20 of within the past three years. That's something that he 
21 worked with Dr. Deuso on and something that I've been trying 
22 to get him to understand, to see, especially as he's taking 
23 responsibilities for these crimes. 
24 So, Mr. Weaver is now 50 years old and struggling 
25 to leave behind an extensive history, an extensive upbringing 
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1 that has from that time to now worked against him but he has 
2 now the resources that he needs to be successful. AP&P 
3 invests a great deal of time in his failures and his past, 
4 but Mr. Weaver has successes now, and he had successes in 
5 2002 and he has successes in getting his, working toward his 
6 own rehabilitation. 
7 What he is simply asking for, Your Honor, is that 
8 you give him the time that he needs in order to complete that 
9 process, in order to become a person who can be trusted, who 
10 can be, if not a model citizen, at least a very good man. 
11 And he is, I think, a very good man at the heart of it. I 
12 think I see that, Your Honor, in the fact that AP&P notes 
13 that he has a history of violence. They note that he's a 
14 possible violent (inaudible) future. 
15 With this criminal history, Your Honor, the only 
16 violent crime he had was his most recent conviction for the 
17 Assault By a Prisoner, and those circumstances, I think, 
18 speak to themselves. He admitted responsibility for that. 
19 He acknowledged what he did was wrong and that his behavior 
20 and his actions led to that, to the commission of that crime. 
21 But there were, at that time, a situation I think that, he 
22 was in a situation that caused that to happen. 
23 He is not inherently a violent man. And I think, 
24 really honestly that he is not inherently an evil man. He 
25 J cares very much and he has the capacity to care for and, 
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1 quite frankly, be cared by a great many people. His sister, 
2 Dr. Deuso has, on his own initiative, invested a great deal 
3 of time and effort in regard to his (inaudible) education. 
4 And quite frankly, as have I. He has worked hard and he has 
5 impressed me how very hard he has worked. And I hope that 
6 you have been able to see that in the past 15 months that we 
7 have been dealing with this case. 
8 Mr. Weaver has a great deal of intelligence. He 
9 has, I think, a great deal of natural empathy, but he will 
10 always struggle to become the person that he should be and 
11 the person I think that he is ultimately capable of being. 
12 What we're simply asking, Your Honor, is that you give him 
13 the opportunity to become that person, and you give him the 
14 opportunity to complete the treatment program he has with Dr. 
15 Deuso, to show this Court, AP&P and ultimately, if possible, 
16 DCFS that he can be a good person, that he can be a person 
17 who ultimately can be responsible for his children. 
18 THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Weaver. 
19 MS. VIERA: Your Honor, if we could have Dr. Deuso 
20 also speak at this time? 
21 THE COURT: Doctor? Go ahead. 
22 DR. DEUSO: Good morning, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Good morning. 
24 DR. DEUSO: I have known Mr. Weaver since just prior 
25 to the event that incarcerated him in 1995, well, it was 
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1 1994, it was about four years ago where he had, he'd actually 
2 been working with a local attorney who had appealed to me to 
3 support him through a process and since that time I have 
4 virtually spent hundreds and hundreds of hours trying to work 
5 with Mike, get him organized and to keep him organized, 
6 Through that period of time I have seen a lot of different 
7 changes and a lot of different challenges that he's had to 
8 meet. He is an interesting and resourceful person. Probably 
9 the most resourceful person I may have ever met, and 
10 impressed certainly in that arena. He tends to be very 
11 impulsive, quite anxious as a person who - in my background I 
12 was a State trooper in Massachusetts for ten years, my first 
13 impression of Michael was he can't be very much of a criminal 
14 because he had too much emotion and too much of a sense of 
15 guilt when people push it and I thought that those were all 
16 vulnerabilities in those populations, so he's been a learning 
17 experience for me, 
18 He has done everything I've ever asked him to do 
19 and more, and in terms of meeting any kind of counseling 
20 expectations, appointments, assignments, trying new skills, 
21 even in efforts that he's made to negotiate with other folks 
22 throughout his life, he's often times tried to imply - employ 
23 things that we've discussed. And that's been impressive. 
24 It's pretty easy to work with someone who will try what you 
25 I ask them to do. 
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1 In terms of the outpatient services that we've 
2 continued to provide him with, I provided those services 
3 because repeatedly he was instructed by different entities to 
4 get his treatment, but because he had remained abstinent and 
5 he was not eligible for admission in virtually all of those 
6 programs. So, as a last effort in January, at his behest to 
7 address this issue, we provided him with intensive outpatient 
8 services which he started about three months ago. He's never 
9 missed a session. He would typically be looking at 
10 graduating from the intensive outpatient portion, right about 
11 this time, and he would be moving into what they consider 
12 general outpatient setting for the next six months. 
13 You know, one of the things that does strike me 
14 when I look back at his history and I hear some of it 
15 reported by his attorney in here is that we certainly 
16 accomplished an awful lot in two or three years and I, you 
17 know, outside of the piece that certainly is expected and 
18 required in terms of accountability, we've done a lot more 
19 than he could have ever done in any incarcerated 
20 circumstance. So, I feel very good about that. 
21 And on a personal level, Mr. Weaver, even though 
22 he's been unable to pay me for services, I don't have any 
23 more snow. I don't have any more trees, I don't have any 
24 more bushes, I don't have any more weeds, and it's all 
25 J reflection of his gestures. Again, spontaneously, two or 
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1 three o'clock on a Sunday afternoon (inaudible) go by my 
2 place and he's pulling weeds. That's not a requirement for 
3 him to stay in treatment with me. I offer it as a genuine 
4 gesture and I'm impressed by the fact that he won't take it 
5 for free, so. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 DR. DEUSO: Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Weaver. 
9 THE COURT: While Mr. Weaver's organizing his 
10 materials, it's okay. What's the State's position? 
11 MR. THOMAS: (Inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. Let's give him the last word. 
13 MR. THOMAS: The State would like to call 
14 (inaudible) of the case, he'd like to be heard. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Weaver, go right ahead. 
16 DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I had to write this out. I 
17 wanted to say to the Honorable Judge Himonas. I'm very 
18 thankful for the time you've let me stay out of jail. With 
19 all these matters being set, I've been working diligently on 
20 all aspects of my life. I've got a list of accolades here 
21 and I'm sure you already know them. 
22 (Speaking with attorney). 
23 Okay. I've been working at least 20 hours per week 
24 for (inaudible) doing landscapes. It's, my schedule is so 
25 I haphazard with meetings and that, that I have not been able 
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1 to keep full-time employment. 
2 I've been committed to an intensive drug and 
3 alcohol treatment program at least nine hours a week, four 
4 hours aftercare and three hours LDS substance abuse. At some 
5 point I offered to help the prosecution clear some of this 
6 stuff up and any stuff that was charged or happen and nobody 
7 seemed to want to work with me. I wrote three letters. I've 
8 been making plans to volunteer for (inaudible) behavior, to 
9 attend parenting through Children's Service Society. At some 
10 point I had been visiting regularly with my children 
11 (inaudible) with visitation rights (inaudible). Even worse, 
12 my children have been bounced from one foster care to another 
13 and it has caused a great deal of stress for not only me, but 
14 for the children. 
15 The children need stability and a loving, but firm, 
16 family relationship in order to prosper, and especially my 
17 children need me, their father, because I can provide this 
18 stability and security now that I have committed myself to my 
19 own recovery. It is my sole hope that all of my work I am 
20 doing now will led to my family (inaudible). The penal 
21 system is full of people who are (inaudible), who are victims 
22 of their own bad (inaudible), drug and alcohol often play a 
23 role in (inaudible). 
24 I know I can do far better than I've done. I have a 
25 J great motivation and I certainly am - I'm not scared to do 
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1 time, I've done plenty of time. I could have done this time 
2 two years ago and probably been out by now. At some point 
3 it's important that I be available to parent these kids, and 
4 this is why I've worked so hard and done so many things to 
5 show the Court and everybody concerned that this is what I 
6 want. Two years ago I could have took the plea, went out, 
7 done my little bit of time and, you know, it's not the first 
8 time. It's not what I want, but I'm not scared to do time. 
9 I want to say what distinguishes me from those 
10 behind prison bars is my drive and commitment to change my 
11 life to make (inaudible) and be the best father I can be. 
12 Above all else I've learned my actions affect others and many 
13 undeserving people suffered as a result of my criminal 
14 activity. Although Brett Thompson was directly affected by 
15 my theft and may never choose to forgive me, I have expressed 
16 sincere apology (inaudible) what I did was wrong. The 
17 affects of my actions have rippled throughout society. My 
18 children directly affected, Brett has, I have. I've learned 
19 new ways to resolve conflict and I feel proud because I'm 
20 working to be a trustworthy individual, especially a 
21 trustworthy father. When people hurt other people that trust 
22 is gone, and that is the (inaudible) that makes it not just 
23 (inaudible). 
24 I sincerely apologize to Brett Thompson for what 
25 I happened. There's no excuse. It was terrible thing. In my 
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1 life I have never done anything like that to anybody like 
2 that. I've done other crimes, but never nothing (inaudible) 
3 like this, and I feel really bad about what happened to 
4 Brett, and I can't undo it and I'm willing to do whatever I 
5 can do to straightened it out with him, any work, anything he 
6 wants, if he's not satisfied with the work I done in his yard 
7 all he's got to do is let me know and I will, I'll make it 
8 (inaudible). I don't expect him to forgive me and I want the 
9 Court to know if there's anything I can do to undo what 
10 happened, to (inaudible) the prosecutors, credit card 
11 company, anybody, and this will never happen again. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 DEFENDANT: And I appreciate the time you let 
14 me out, you know, against your better judgment at times. 
15 Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Weaver. 
17 Yes. 
18 MR. THOMAS: Judge, if we could call Brett Thompson? 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Thompson, if you'll come up here. 
20 Mr. Weaver is you'll stand over to the side, 
21 please, with Ms. Viera. 
22 Mr. Thompson, go right ahead. 
23 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I appreciate the 
24 opportunity to address the Court. This matter has been no 
25 small thing to my family and I over the last couple of years. 
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1 Prior to that, my association with Mike was that of a friend. 
2 I even looked at myself as sort of a mentor at the 
3 (inaudible). Age differences are such, I being younger than 
4 him, I felt the opportunity, a sincere opportunity to take 
5 him under my wing in a way and to try and help him through 
6 some difficult times that he was experiencing with his 
7 children, in his life, to try and understand him and help him 
8 get a little bit of a leg up. There were folks that 
9 different times during this time said, "This is crazy, why 
10 are spending all this time and effort and so forth on someone 
11 who is a current criminal?" And I asked myself that many, 
12 many times as well. 
13 I've heard many things, as I've heard Mike express 
14 to the Court today, I've heard the same kind of things 
15 expressed to me over different circumstances, many times in 
16 the past, and he has the ability to come off very, very 
17 sincere. And the thing is is I don't doubt his sincerity. 
18 What I doubt is his ability to control himself and, yes, he's 
19 53 years old and days and weeks that I - months, years that I 
20 spent with him, not the whole time, but various times, I 
21 always felt the ability that I would have the ability to make 
22 some sort of a difference with him. 
23 Well, during that summer when I hired him to work 
24 in my yard, we were doing some remodeling, I felt as though 
25 J our friendship was at a good point, frankly, a strong point, 
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1 a peak point. And I gave him the opportunity to be alone in 
2 my house for probably no more than about an hour while I went 
3 out and did an errand and during that time he proceeded to go 
4 into my house, through my house, into my upstairs, into my 
5 bedroom and go through dressers and drawers until he found 
6 some credit cards that I hadn't used in a long time and then 
7 he took them. And then he waited for some time, I believe, 
8 from a calculated standpoint, and - to see if they'd be 
9 missed and they weren't, we didn't use these cards, and then 
10 he began to charge things on them. Small at first, and then 
11 larger and larger, and then finally he was caught. 
12 He proceeded to tell me afterwards when he called 
13 me from jail that it was my fault because I had made it too 
14 easy for him, and I suppose in this instance that making it 
15 easy for him was a demonstration of trust on my part to him. 
16 And I don't come here as a vindictive individual, I come here 
17 just simply to state a frustration and this has been an 
18 extreme hardship on my family, not just financially. Mike 
19 told me that he did this with the credit cards because he 
20 knew that we wouldn't be held liable for this, that it would 
21 just be the credit card companies that would basically take 
22 the fall for this. Well, that's not been the case actually, 
23 we were in the process of starting a business and that had an 
24 affect on our credit rating and we were unable to obtain some 
25 loans that we needed. We were fine but, but things like 
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1 this, appointments that I'm missing right now for my work, I 
2 feel as though those are investments in this particular issue 
3 with Mike and it continues to go on. 
4 My wife has been very traumatized by the fact that 
5 someone was in our house, uninvited, going through her 
6 things, and my children as well, and needless to say, this 
7 has been a very, very difficult time. I know that Mike has 
8 struggled with his kids. I know that he's struggled with his 
9 recidivism and in his criminal activities. However, Your 
10 Honor, I felt it very important to come and say this before 
11 the Court. I appreciate your time. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 MR. THOMAS: We call Deputy Sanford, case number, 
14 for case ending 7618, (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 DEPUTY SANFORD: I just wanted to make the Court 
17 aware that the situation involving Mr. Weaver and the 
18 transport from the courthouse to the jail was probably the 
19 most stressful and challenging physical altercation I had in 
20 10 years of police work. He convinced me that his intention 
21 was to kick out the window and jump out of that vehicle while 
22 we were in motion on the freeway, and that he would use any 
23 means possible to effect that, including harming me. And in 
24 my opinion he showed a reckless and selfish disregard for 
25 public safety, and a reckless disregard to his own safety. 
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And my biggest concern, I had my weapon on, I had 
previously made the judgment and evaluation on him that he 
was not going to calm down and I made a special transport 
arrangement for him to be transported by himself with two 
deputies. And I attempted to restrain him from the beginning 
and he - his physical actions were extremely violent. He 
kicked and pushed himself with his feet on the ceiling over 
the seat, landed on me and proceeded to wrestle me all over 
the inside of that van for nearly 10 minutes, and he did not 
voluntarily end the confrontation. I had to gain physical 
control of him without - I had some serious doubts at the 
time whether I'd be able to achieve that. 
I also need to let the Court know that I was 
injured and I was - my muscles were sore for three days 
afterwards, that's probably the most committed physical 
altercation I've ever had in my life, and I've also spend 20 
years studying Karate as well, so I'm no stranger to physical 
exertion and aggressive fights, I guess is the best way to 
put it. 
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1 that he exhibited was that each time a new person came, he 
2 would redirect his attention to that person, he would start a 
3 whole series of statements over again from the beginning in 
4 an attempt to gain his way, and I saw that and I said, xxthis 
5 is not going in a good direction." And that's why I decided 
6 to get him out of there and get him to jail. And he did not 
7 stop fighting until I put him in this position where I was 
8 actually afraid that I was going to hurt him. I had him in a 
9 position where he was pinned up against the wall of the van 
10 (inaudible) of the seat and all of my weight was on his head 
11 and shoulder, and that was when he stopped fighting. So 
12 that's all I have to say. 
13 THE COURT: Anything else? 
14 MR. THOMAS: Yes, Judge, the State's position is 
15 that this defendant be sentenced to prison, forthwith. 
16 Second, we are in full agreement with these recommendations 
17 for consecutive. Essentially, Judge, this case (inaudible) 
18 upon everything discussed in the report, primarily, these are 
19 single criminal episodes involving multiple victims as well 
20 as the exhaustive history. 
21 Judge, if I could just address a few other things 
22 defense counsel raised. With respect to the recommendations 
23 of AP&P, essentially case ending 2866 occurs while his child 
24 was in the car, that was the violent felony, the violent 
25 I felony of a dangerous weapon, so this assertion that it's 
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1 criminal activity is the result of losing his children, at 
2 least with respect to that case, doesn't seem plausible. 
3 Finally, the aggravating circumstances addressed, I 
4 think further warrant consecutive sentencing and that is his 
5 attitude is not conducive to supervision. They noted that in 
6 the report, it wasn't just because of his long criminal 
7 history, but his attitude and also the LSI puts him in a high 
8 risk to victimize (inaudible) further. That together, Judge, 
9 with his significant history of victimizing the community, 
10 he, this will be his fourth (inaudible) conviction. He's got 
11 over 45 arrests and close to 16 misdemeanor convictions. 
12 As far as - further I believe, AP&P is concerned 
13 about his ability to be supervised due to his history of 
14 supervision. He was paroled and revoked, I believe, seven 
15 times. He was an inmate on 11 different occasions and just 
16 recently, Judge, he was, his felony probation, this, I think 
17 three-four years ago was revoked in two different courtrooms. 
18 The defense counsel does cite successful completion of 
19 probation, however, case ending 7618 occurred while he was 
20 out on pre-trial services. The assault against Deputy 
21 Sanford occurred while he was already on felony - in 
22 jurisdiction of felony court. So, his compliance with court 
23 orders, with supervision is, quite frankly with all due 
24 respect, has been dismal. 
25 The other thing that is concerning, Mr. Weaver 
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1 raises the issue that, you know, he's helped, he's tried to 
2 help prosecution, you know, resolve these matters with 
3 (inaudible) sincerity. However, it's noted in the Pre-
4 Sentence Report by Mr. Weaver's own statement that he 
5 admitted to the, sorry, the victim, you know, this is the 
6 victim in the other matter, the burglary, that he misled the 
7 police and prosecution in order to buy time for his deal. 
8 That seems quite the opposite of Mr. Weaver (inaudible) 
9 today. In fact, the explanation he gives that it wasn't him, 
10 again, not taking into, taking accountability for his 
11 actions, it seems to be even more culpable that he would set 
12 somebody up, throw them under the bus, so that he could use 
13 his testimony to essentially get his children back, and 
14 holding that - withholding that information so that he could 
15 use that as leverage with the feds. 
16 THE COURT: All right, wrap up. 
17 MR. THOMAS: Okay. So, Judge, everything that's 
18 considered, and the State is in full agreement with the 
19 recommendation from AP&P and that is prison, consecutively 
20 (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: Briefly, Ms. Viera. 
22 MS. VIERA: Very briefly, Your Honor, I just want to 
23 make two points. The statements regarding (inaudible) heard 
24 them as well, did occur, however, before Mr. Weaver entered 
25 J into the plea agreement. As I stated, he has been working 
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very hard (inaudible) responsibility and he's made great 
steps in that regard. 
In regard to not being conducive to supervision, he 
is proving now that he is conducive to supervision, has 
proven that he has (inaudible) supervision. That is what 
he's been doing. He's doing exactly what he's been told to 
do, and I believe that he (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Is there any legal reason of which you 
are aware of why I should not proceed to sentence? 
MS. VIERA: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. With respect to Count, to 
case ending 866, with a charge of the Possession or Purchase 
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree 
Felony, Mr. Weaver, I'm sentencing you to 0-5 at the Utah 
State Prison. 
With respect to case ending 570, Forgery, a Third 
Degree Felony, I'm sentencing you to 0-5 at the Utah State 
Prison. 
With respect to the charge of Burglary, a Second 
Degree Felony, I'm sentencing you to 1-15 at the Utah State 
Prison. 
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consecutive to one another, 
2 I Mr. Weaver, I am, it is with a heavy heart, but 
3 your, your extensive criminal history and the multiplicity of 
4 actions just cries out for such serious sanction. This isn't 
5 the time, Mr. Weaver. He is going to be committed to the 
6 Utah State Prison for 1-30 years. 
7 I also want to state on the record the basis for 
8 the consecutive finding, the extensive criminal history as 
9 well as the fact that we are dealing with multiple different 
10 criminal episodes in this matter. You have 30 days in which 
11 to appeal. Thank you, 
12 DEFENDANT: Your Honor, (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: Talk to Ms. Viera here quickly, Mr, 
14 Weaver, take care of it, 
15 DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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RULE 23B MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL AND ENTRY 
OF FINDINGS OF FACT 
Case No. 20070136-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant 
Michael Weaver moves this Court for an Order remanding the case to the trial court for 
the entry of findings of fact due to the existence of "nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that 
counsel was ineffective.1' Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver is currently appealing his conviction of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a third degree felony. See 
Record on Appeal ("R") at 207. Mr. Weaver's appellate arguments will claim, inter alia, 
1 
that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. U.S. 
Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
In State v. Litherkwd, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, our high court noted the many 
difficulties that face appellate counsel in his or her attempt to raise ineffective claims 
against trial counsel In the past, cw[g]enerally[,] a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 
cannot be raised on appeal because the trial record is insufficient to allow the claim to be 
determined/' 2000 UT 76, «j| 12 (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991)). Our supreme court also recognized, however, that the actions or inactions of trial 
counsel may have contributed to an inadequate record. wt[W]ith respect to the defendant's 
burden of providing an adequate record on appeal, counsel's ineffectiveness may have 
caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the record deficiencies, thus presenting the 
defendant with a catch-22 unique to claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 7 6 4 12. 
In an effort to allow for a proper record for reviewing ineffective claims, rule 23B 
was adopted in 1992. The rule now provides that "[a] party to an appeal in a criminal 
case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact 
... necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). uWith the adoption of this rule, a ready procedural 
mechanism for addressing the inadequate record dilemma was grafted into the appeals 
process." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  14. 
Indeed, when faced with an inadequate record on appeal, this Court has found 
2 
itself unable to address many contested issues due to the lack of factual findings in the 
record. See Prove City v. Thompson, 2002 UT App. 63, H 11, 44 P-3d 828 ("defendant 
did not request a remand under Rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
substantiate the assertion he now argues would support his claim of ineffective assistance. 
Without a proper record before us, we are unable to say whether counsel's alleged 
deficiency in failing to investigate prejudiced defendant."); State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 
(Utah App. 1998) (finding record inadequate for treatment of ineffectiveness claims). 
The Litherland opinion concluded, however, "where, on direct appeal, defendant 
raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective (and assuming defendant is represented by 
different counsel than at trial), defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is 
adequate/' 2000 UT 76, |^ 16. uIf a defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation 
of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a 
determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant bears the 
primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand." Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,1|16. 
In accordance with the above authority, Mr. Weaver thus moves this Court to stay 
the briefing schedule and to remand this case to the trial court for supplementation of the 
record on appeal with specific, non-speculative facts, which support his claimed 
violations of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, U.S. Const, amend. VI; State 
v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 5461J 17, 128 P.3d 556 (Utah App. 2005) (citation omitted) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel may be established by showing that counsel *\\) 
3 
rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him"). 
ARGUMENT 
"Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not 
been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to 
the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working 
days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-l8-l(6)(a). Mr. Weaver's pro se docketing statement, tiled April 4, 2007, 
already outlined a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence report which 
were not corrected at sentencing: 
Prior to sentencing January 12, 2007, Mr. Weaver (Appellee) received a copy of 
the Presentence Report from LDA Viera, this was on January 10lh late afternoon. 
When Mr. Weaver reviewed the report he became concerned as the content of the 
report was not accurate and very biased. At one of the interviews with APP Mr. 
Weaver was told by supervisor Ken Shelton that as long as Mr. Weaver continued 
to perform as he was while on probation APP had no reason to recommend 
incarceration. The report contained no mention of such an agreement. Nor did the 
report contain a log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church, 
court appearances, completed programing, psychological testing, and status of 
children's placement, nor any interview with employers or the attempt by Mr. 
Weaver to recover lost property from the credit card, nor did the report contain the 
fact that the credit card victim Brett Thompson was in "'collusion" with the foster 
parents of my children. LDA Brenda Viera as well as the court prosecutors were 
well aware of the improper relationship of Brett Thompson and Craig Kehl as both 
appeared at several court hearings. This relationship borders on revenge instead of 
justice by Mr. Thompson - my children's status, visiting has been used by the 
Kehls (foster parents) as a tool for many months. This is also in court records 
(Juvenile Court). 
I appeared before Judge Himonas January 1 llh 2007, in an attempt to speak to him 
about all of the above as well as my attorney's ineffective eoeicion of plea, failure 
4 
to correct Presentence and fact she never intended to follow through on her 
promise to use "full LDA resources". She actually went on vacation right after my 
plea. Judge Himonas told me he couldn't talk to me about anything, as there was 
no persecutor there and it was ex parte. 1 hereby requested the court to review 
facts and grant a new trial, appeal bond and new counsel. 1 have requested an 
attorney through the Court to hand this appeal, so far nothing... 
See State of Utah v. Michael Samuel Weaver, Docketing Statement, filed April 4, 2007 (a 
copy is attached as Addendum A).1 
An evidentiary hearing is needed to supplement the record with facts relevant to 
whether prior defense counsel, having been informed by his client of errors in the pre-
sentence report, still neglected to bring such matters to the attention of the trial court. 
If resolution of the objections affects the trial court's view of the appropriate 
sentence, the trial court may then revise the sentence accordingly. This disposition 
is appropriate in the present case because [Appellant] alleges that he was 
prejudiced by the district court's failure to resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the 
report. Allowing the district court to revisit the sentences after resolving the 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report gives appropriate 
deference to the district court's sentencing function. Accordingly, we remand, but 
reject the State's request that we affirm the sentences prior to remand. 
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 (per curiam) (a copy of the unpublished decision is 
attached as Addendum B) (citing State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, <\\ 31, 94 P.3d 
295). 
The same sort of prejudice exists in the case at bar. Coincidentally, the above 
quoted language and appeal also involved the same defendant, with similar principles 
1
 Affidavits typically are used in support of a Rule 23 B motion. Utah R. App. P 23B(b). Hie above 
statements were personally written by Mr. Weaver and attested to through his signature to the pro se pleading. His 
docketing statement is the functional equivalent of the affidavit. 
5 
ringing true in both matters. For example, in the prior Weaver appeal, this Court noted, 
"While the State's arguments that Weaver was not prejudiced by any alleged error and that 
the issue is now moot are plausible, the record is not sufficiently clear to allow us to make 
those determinations.... Further, while Weaver speaks mainly to the jail term associated 
with his probation, it is possible that resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence 
investigation report could have led to different, and more favorable, probationary terms." 
Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 n. 1. 
Resolution of the inaccuracies in the presentence report may have had a bearing f 
\ 
here as well. ff[I]t is of no moment that the trial court may disregard the presentence 
report altogether in imposing a sentence. A defendant still has a right to disclosure of the 
report because of the subsequent uses made of it." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1009 
(Utah 1982) (citing State v. Lockwood, 399 So.2d 190 (La. 1981)); State v. Lipsky, 608 
P.2d 1241 (Utah, 1980) ("A defendant's right to be sentenced on the basis of information 
that is accurate can be protected only if the pre-sentence report is disclosed to him prior to 
sentencing;'); State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1981) ("We mandated that the report 
should be disclosed to the defendant and if he thinks the report is inaccurate in any 
particular, he should then be given the opportunity to bring such inaccuracies to the 
court's attention/'). 
One difference between the two Weaver appeals should be noted. In the previous 
remanded appeal, see 2007 UT App 229, ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") 
6 
arguments were raised but not decided in the opinion. In the current appeal, IAC 
arguments are the only means through which this Court may address his sentencing issue. 
Plain error is inapposite because Weaver's trial counsel failed to raise the sentencing 
inaccuracies with the trial judge. A lower court cannot err on matters of which it had no 
knowledge. 
u[W]ith respect to the defendant's burden of providing an adequate record on 
appeal, counsel's ineffectiveness may have caused, exacerbated, or contributed to the 
record deficiencies, thus presenting the defendant with a catch-22 unique to claims of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, "j| 12. Indeed here, in violation 
of the statute against waiver, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(b), prior defense counsel did 
in fact cause, exacerbate, or contribute to the record deficiencies by failing to challenge 
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report. See id. ("If a party fails to challenge 
the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter 
shall be considered to be waived.").2 
Rule 23B allows the record to be supplemented with facts relating to prior defense 
counsel's ineffectiveness. Both prongs of the IAC standard are met. Prior counsel's 
failure to disclose the inaccuracies in the presentence report constituted "deficient 
performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" 
While this Court has required the attorney, who acts on behalf of the defendant, to preserve the record for 
his client, the opposite is not true A defendant need not personally and independently object to the introduction of 
evidence at trial nor to the inaccuracies in a PSR in an effort to supplant the role of his inactive attorney. Otherwise, 
there would be no such theory as ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant himself, separate and apart 
irom the attorney's (m)actions, would be held responsible foi any and ail attorney wrongdoing 
7 
and "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 
1009 (Utah 1982) ("[I]t is of no moment that the trial court may disregard the presentence 
report altogether in imposing a sentence"); Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 n.l ("it is possible 
that resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence investigation report could have led to 
different, and more favorable, probationary terms.") 
DATED this \&_ day of August, 2007 
RONALD FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
1, VANESSA COLEMAN, hereby certify that on this|£#~day of August, 2007,1 
have caused a copy of the foregoing be delivered to the following recipient: 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O.Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
umm fA 'JM. 
VANESSA COLEMAN 
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Addendum A 
(State of Utah v. Michael Samuel Weaver, 
Docketing Statement, filed April 4, 2007) 
SAMPLE FORM 
D O C K E T I N G S T A T E M E N T O U T L I J S & _
 r t
 flL&-
[Counsel's name & bar number 
Counsel's address 
Counsel\s telephone number j 
Counsel for Appellant . 
[PLAINTIFF.!, 
Rlaintiff/Appeflant, 
vs. 
[DEFENDANT I, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
:-V-i_A\ "AH C l c ^ v A 
; IN THE A A M E u F C u U R T ' 
I ' ; ' APR fU 7fi.,; 
!.M.)CKl:TiNC.i STATEMENT 
C W . \ u . Appellate cosr number] Z<*> 7£>« S"* ClA 
Ueanc; Ci. No [Di.sm O . number| c>6 / c}<0£>{&&> 
C ia:.:> mmioe ; • 
PURSUANT TO RULE 9, Utah Rules of Appellate iho^caure, appellant submits in is docketing 
statement. 
1. Nature oi" the proceeding. Uns appeal i.> w jm-a fma! jucgiTientT^raerJ [decree] of the [identify 
lower court or agency]. ^ - _-—-""^"^ 
2. Jurisdiction. This Court ha* jurisdiction puisuaiu to [Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)( )] [Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)( )]. 
3. Relevant dates. 
a. Date the final judgment or order appealed from was entered: J ^ "v ^ " X «-'- "? 
b. Date the notice of appeal or petition for review was hied; -— 
c U ) Date any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
k u e 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or ! Itah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 were filed: — 
(2.) Date and effect of any orders disposing of such motions; 
4. Inmate mailbox rule. The appeliai(f[isj fts notj an inmate confined in an insLiturion invoking rule 
5. Rule 54(b). This appeal {'is jQj^ jfTG^Jj^ 11*1 a , ! J K ^ ; ;Ii a multiple part) or a multiple claim case in 
which the judgment has been certified as a final mogmeiu h\ the trial com! pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
Ruie^of Civil Procedure. |l.f fins is such a case, add the following mformation;] 
(^jT^"'3Tie following claims and parties remain before, live !r;ai coun I'oi adjudication: 
b. The facts underlying this appeal iarej |aie notj sufficieiuly similar to the facts underlying the 
claims remaining before the trial court to eonstmiie res judicata on tiiose chums.. 
6. Criminal cases. (If this is a criminal ease, Male j __--._ 
a. The defendant was jciiarged wjihj |fi me appea; arises iroiu a dismissaKQj^^ the 
appeal arises from a conviction) the ioiiuving cnmeiS;. ''list: •>-. ^ . ; ) 
0 The delendam received tin: following sosiLence. . s» >c:c i (\ venience|. /" f$' \ > ^ i ^ i C / y 
: hue lielendari! c u r r e n t l ^ T ^ ^ s noli iii.-;iK-.c.m:ii-d. < ;^~m-..r- ^ V ^ ' ^ V ^ ^ V 
•i.-mpcal A p n e M a i r . W f f c i M o a ^ . ^ *V*x^ ^f^r^i 
^ P ^ c * e V > , ^ 
;.:-,uei.Si on apnea-
.Succinctly stale riic firs! issue ; 
ima::vc |;.iw Ufilc any s;.;mm-:>. -me.-., o- c»:se.- ucie: mmanve ,.)! ihe Orsi issue 
VHv:^ W^m> , _ p , C , ^ y . / - - v - p ^ c " \
 s • ' ~ • f X d tf^V^Wv. 
fe. 
Standard of review: [State applicable standard of appellate review for the first issue, with 
supporting authority.) 
b, [Repeat for any additional issues.] 
: Determinative law: |Cite any statutes, rules, or cases doi.ormiuaiivc ui the second issue.] 
Standard of review: [State applicable standard of appellate review for the second issue, with 
^supporting authority.] 
S.yFactual summary. [Succinctly summarize the face, ueccssai v lo understand the issue(s) presented.] 
9. Assignment. This appeal [is.|([is rjoj^suhjeci to transfer by ihe Supreme Couri to the Court of. 
Appealsjnirsuan( to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4;. j If appropriate, add: j The appellant (advocates] 
[J^pposesljuch a transferor) the following grounds; 
"I'd. List one or more grounds]. 
JO. Related appeala^There are no related appeals.]]Tho following are related or prior appeals; 
a. Give name, case mJFi^i 
J J. Attachments. The following are attached: __. T j , M"x 
a. The final .judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. -$— ^'^- C ^ ^ f ^ ^ 0 ^ * 
l:>. Any rulings and/or findings of the trial cnurl or administrative tribunal included in the judgment rV '• .,» 
or order from which the appeal is taken. 
e. Any application for rehearing filed pursiiain to I itah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (if the appeal arises 
from an order of the Public Service CommissioiiJ or nodce of claim filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-J2 (if it arises from claims against the Stale or its employee aciing within the scope of employment 
or under color of authority). 
d. The notice of appeal and any order extending r.he nine for the filing of a notice of appeal. 
e. Any motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(h), .52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, and any orders disposing of 
such motions. 
f. ]f the appellant is an inmate confined in an msutuuon invoking rule 4(f), the notarized statement 
or written declaration required by rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED; * 
|Signature of attorney or pro se party) pj^c / /VW-- t ' '"" 
•Name of attorney or pro se party] , n 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correei copy of the foregoing Docketing Sun.cmenl was mailed by first class mail 
this jdate] to the following: 
[Opposing counsel's name and address] 
[If the appeal arises from a crime charged as a iclony or a juvenile court delinquency proceeding, include 
following:] 
Utah Attorney General 
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Addendum B 
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 229 (per curiam) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael S. Weaver, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060482-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 28, 2007) 
2 0 07 UT App 22 9 
Second District, Farmington Department, 051700456 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Attorneys: Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne. 
PER CURIAM: 
Michael S. Weaver appeals his sentence for theft, a third 
degree felony. Weaver argues that the district court erred by 
failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report. He also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to ensure that the district court 
resolved the alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report. 
Weaver argues that the district court erred in failing to 
resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report. The State concedes that the district court failed to 
comply with Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a) by not resolving the 
alleged inaccuracies on the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(6) (a) (Supp. 2006). However, the State argues that Weaver was 
not prejudiced by this mistake during sentencing, or 
alternatively, that the issue is moot because Weaver has already 
served his jail term. Accordingly, it requests this court to 
affirm Weaver's sentence and remand solely to comply with section 
77-18-1 (6) (a) . 
In State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295, we held 
chat the district court erred m failing to resolve Maroney's 
objections to the sentencing reports, and we remanded to allow 
the court to resolve the objections on the record. See id. at 
1(31. We went on to state that " [i] f resolution of the objections 
affects the trial court's view of the appropriate sentence, the 
trial court may then revise the sentence accordingly." Id. This 
disposition is appropriate in the present case because Weaver 
alleges that he was prejudiced by the district court's failure to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the report. Allowing the 
district court to revisit the sentences after resolving the 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report 
gives appropriate deference to the district court's sentencing 
function. Accordingly, we remand, but reject the State's request 
that we affirm the sentences prior to remand.l 
Based upon our review of the record and the State's 
concession, we remand the case so "the sentencing judge can 
consider the objections to the presentence report, make findings 
on the record as to whether the information objected to is 
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is 
relevant to sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT l,f44, 973 
P. 2d 404. After resolving the alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report, the district court may revise 
the sentence as it deems appropriate. Our disposition makes it 
unnecessary to consider Weaver's alternative argument alleging 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
This matter is remanded to the district court. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1While the State's arguments that Weaver was not prejudiced 
by any alleged error and that the issue is now moot are 
plausible, the record is not sufficiently clear to allow us to 
make those determinations. More particularly, we do not know the 
exact nature of the alleged inaccuracies with the presentence 
investigation report. Further, while Weaver speaks mainly to the 
jail term associated with his probation, it is possible that 
resolution of the inaccuracies in his presentence investigation 
report could have led to different, and more favorable, 
probationary terms. 
20:60482-CA 2 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
STATE'S RESPONSE IN 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT5S 
RULE 23B MOTION TO REMAND 
v. : 
MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER, : Case No. 20070136-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Defendant seeks a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
explore his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise and correct 
at sentencing "a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence [investigation] 
report[.]" Rule 23B Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand the Case to the Trial 
Court for Supplementation of the Record on Appeal and Entry of Findings of Fact ["Memo"] 
at 4-5. 
The State opposes a remand because defendant has neither alleged specific, non-
record facts, which if true, would establish that counsel rendered deficient performance nor 
provided the requisite sworn support therefor. The State's position is set out more fully 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 28, 2006, as part of a plea agreement globally disposing of four 
outstanding cases against him, defendant entered a guilty plea in this case to possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted felon, a third degree felony, and the court ordered 
preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (R 152-53, 158). The charge to which 
defendant pled guilty involved the discovery of "a sharp kitchen knife" during a search of 
defendant's car and defendant's prior conviction of a violent felony (R 39-40, 154-61). 
Sentencing occurred on January 12, 2007 (R 164). The court sentenced defendant to 
an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the state prison (R 164). Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal (R 169-70). New counsel was appointed for defendant and has filed 
a motion pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand the case to the 
trial court for a hearing and entry of findings of fact on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing (R 200-04). Defendant seeks to "supplement the record with facts 
relevant to whether prior defense counsel, having been informed by his client of errors in the 
pre-sentence report, still neglected to bring such matters to the attention of the trial court." 
Memo at 5. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RULE 23B MOTION BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAS PROVIDED NEITHER NONSPECULATIVE 
ALLEGATIONS OF NONRECORD FACTS NOR SWORN SUPPORT 
FOR HIS CLAIMS, AS IS REQUIRED BY THE RULE 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because she failed 
to correct at sentencing "a number of inaccuracies and omissions in the presentence report[.]" 
Memo at 4-5. He provides a list of infonnation omitted from his presentence investigation 
[PSI] report and, quoting from one of his previous appeals, argues summarily that 
"[resolution of the inaccuracies in the presentence report may have had a bearing" in this 
case. Id. at 6. His sole support for his motion is his pro se docketing statement, which he 
views to be "the functional equivalent of the affidavit" required by rule 23B. Id. at 5, n.l. 
This Court should deny defendant's motion because defendant entirely fails to meet 
his burden under the rule to adduce, through affidavits, "nonspeculative allegation^] of facts, 
not fully appearing in the record on appeal" that could support his claim of ineffectiveness 
at sentencing. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) & (b). 
A. Requirements for obtaining a remand under rule 23B 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both: (1) that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that "there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690,694 (1984); State v. Holbert, 2002 UT 
3 
App 426, f 58, 61 P.3d 291 (holding there was no deficient performance where counsel's 
action may be the result of a tactical choice); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  19, 
12 P.3d 92 (addressing the prejudice prong); State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) 
(same). The showing of prejudice must be a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative 
matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (quotation omitted). 
This Court has explained that there are "four basic requirements for obtaining a 23B 
remand" which go beyond merely alleging that counsel was ineffective: 
• First, the motion must be supported by affidavits that set forth "'facts not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance 
of the attorney.'" State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, \ 8, 13 P.3d 175 
(quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(b)). 
• Second, "the facts alleged in support of a [r]ule 23B motion may not be 
speculative." Id. at j^ 10. They must be specific and "done by affidavit." Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
• Third, the allegations must show that counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient or, in other words, "the nonspeculative facts must focus on why 
counsel's performance was deficient." Id. 
• Finally, the supporting affidavits must "'allege facts that show the claimed 
prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient 
performance."' Id. at ^ 13 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B(b)). Or, the alleged 
facts, if true, must show "that the result would have been different had 
counsel's performance not been deficient." Id. 
4 
B. Defendant has not alleged sufficient facts to show what was omitted from 
the PSI report let alone facts which establish that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for not raising the "omissions" below 
Defendant bases his ineffectiveness claim on a list of "inaccuracies and omissions" 
which he initially submitted in his pro se docketing statement. See Memo at 4-5. Quoting 
from that document, defendant claims that his former counsel should have informed the 
sentencing court that the PSI made no reference to 
-a statement allegedly made by defendant's probation supervisor Ken Shelton 
that so long as defendant continued to perform as he was while on probation[,] 
AP[&]P had no reason to recommend incarceration"; 
-a "log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church, court 
appearances, completed program[m]ing, psychological testing, and status of 
children's placement"; 
-an "interview with employers"; 
-defendant's attempt "to recover lost property from the credit card"1; and 
-collusion between the credit card victim and the foster parents of defendant's 
kids. 
Memo at 4. Defendant's list, however, falls far short of rule 23B's requirement that he allege 
specific facts that establish counsel's deficient performance, and he offers nothing apart from 
this list to support his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
!One of the original charges against defendant involved his theft and use of credit 
cards from Brett Thompson. See PSI Report at 2, 5. 
5 
1. Omission of supervisor's statement. Defendant faults his counsel for failing to 
inform the sentencing court of a statement made by defendant's probation supervisor Ken 
Shelton that Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P] would have "no reason to recommend 
incarceration" so long as defendant continued to perform well on probation. Memo at 4. 
However, he provides no authority suggesting such a statement must be included in a PSI 
report, no affidavit from Mr. Shelton or anyone else who would testify on remand that the 
statement was made, and no allegation of facts concerning the context in which the statement 
was made or its relationship to the sentencing proceedings in this case. In addition, 
defendant provides no support for his claim that his prior counsel had any knowledge of this 
or any of the information allegedly omitted from the PSI report. He simply asserts in his 
memorandum that his counsel "ha[d] been informed by h[er] client of errors in the 
presentence report[.]5' Id at 5. 
In fact, the record reflects that defense counsel understood AP&P's position on 
sentencing differently. Defense counsel informed the sentencing court that defendant's 
probation agent was Troy Staker and that Mr. Staker told counsel before the guilty plea was 
entered that "he was more geared toward rehabilitation" and could not "overlook" 
defendant's extensive thirty-five-year criminal history (R 207:37-38). See PSI Report at 4, 
8-13. Defendant's unsupported allegation is at odds with the record and, without more, is 
wholly inadequate to establish any deficient performance relating to this claim. 
6 
2. Absence of a "log of the various therapy, counseling, psychotherapy, church, 
court appearances, completed program[m]ing, psychological testing, and status of 
children's placement". Defendant alleges that his former counsel rendered deficient 
performance when she failed to inform the sentencing court that the PSI report did not 
include a comprehensive compilation of defendant's various mandatory and voluntary efforts 
to atone for his actions and obtain help for his long-term problems. See Memo at 4. 
However, he provides absolutely no facts elaborating on the specific information he claims 
should have been included in such a "log," and he fails to cite authority requiring that such 
information be included in the PSI report. Without the additional information, supported by 
a sworn statement, defendant's general list falls short of his burden to adduce 
"nonspeculative allegations] of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal" which 
show counsel's allegedly deficient performance. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) & (b); 
Johnston, 2000 UT App 290, \ 8. 
Moreover, the sentencing court had before it much of the type of information to 
which defendant alludes. Defendant himself explained to the court that his schedule was 
filled with meetings, that he was "committed to an intensive drug and alcohol treatment 
program at least nine hours a week[,]"and that he had "been making plans to volunteer for 
(inaudible) behavior, [and] to attend parenting [classes]" (R 207:47). 
Defendant's therapist, Dr. Deuso, spoke at length about his association with defendant 
since 1995 (R 207:43-46). He explained that they've spent "virtually . . . hundreds and 
7 
hundreds of hours" working together, and that defendant did "everything" Dr. Deuso 
required of him in terms of meeting "counseling expectations, appointments, assignments, 
[and] trying new skills" (R 207:44). Dr. Deuso provided outpatient services when defendant 
was not eligible for admission into the normal programs, started "intensive outpatient 
services" three months before sentencing, and noted that defendant had "never missed a 
session" (R 207:45). He also highlighted his belief that defendant had "accomplished an 
awful lot in two or three years . . . a lot more than he could have ever done in any 
incarcerated circumstance." (id). 
The PSI report contains defendant's statement that he was going to court "as 
scheduled" at the time he stole Mr. Thompson's credit cards, references defendant's 
completion of only seven substance abuse classes in March 2002, and reflects that at the time 
the report was prepared, defendant was "attending mental health treatment through A&D 
clinical psychotherapy." PSI Report at 7, 16, 19. 
Defense counsel told the court that defendant had been "doing exactly what he's been 
told to do" and that he had worked "very hard" at his own rehabilitation (R 207:43, 57). She 
noted that since 2002, defendant had successfully completed a two-year probation, was 
"compliant" with the district and juvenile courts, and that he "has always come to Court, he 
has always done what was required of him[,] and he has always done what he said he would 
do" (R 207:39-40). She explained that, "on his own initiative," he had been attending 
8 
treatment with Dr. Deuso and was providing services to the therapist in exchange for the 
treatment (R 207:39). 
Counsel also covered on the record the status of defendant's children, informing the 
court that defendant's parental rights were terminated in August of 2006 and that defendant 
was focused on appealing that decision (id). Defendant explained that he visited his children 
"regularly" when he had visitation rights and that they "have been bounced from one foster 
care to another[,]" causing "a great deal of stress" for all involved (R 207:47). 
The present record clearly contains an abundance of information concerning the 
general areas on defendant's list, including defendant's efforts at rehabilitation and 
responsibility, and defendant has not alleged that any crucial information was omitted. 
3. Omission of "any interview with employers". Defendant claims his former 
counsel was deficient for failing to inform the court below of the absence from the PSI report 
of "any interview with employers". Memo at 4. Contrary to rule 23B(b)5 he offers no 
elaboration or sworn support for this claim and, hence, fails to show that the information was 
necessary to the PSI report or that there was anything deficient in counsel's failure to raise 
it below. 
4. Omission of defendant's attempt to recover lost property. While defendant 
faults his counsel for failing to point out that the PSI report made no mention of his attempt 
"to recover lost property from the credit card," he defeats his own motion by again providing 
9 
no additional information or sworn support concerning the claim, as required by rule 23B. 
Memo at 4. 
Moreover, defendant told the sentencing court that "[a]t some point [he] offered to 
help the prosecution clear some of this stuff up and any stuff that was charged or happen[ed] 
and nobody seemed to want to work with [him]" (R 207:47). He did not claim to have made 
any additional effort to recover lost property, suggesting that the "attempt" to do so that is 
referenced in his motion amounted only to the rejected offer to the prosecution, of which the 
sentencing judge had knowledge. 
5. No mention of collusion between victim and foster parents. Finally, defendant 
notes the absence from the PSI report of any mention of the "collusion" between the credit 
card victim, Brett Thompson, and the foster father of defendant's children. See Memo at 4. 
He claims that his counsel necessarily knew of the "improper relationship" through the 
appearance of both men "at several court hearings" and that counsel rendered deficient 
performance by failing to bring the relationship to the attention of the sentencing court Id. 
at 4-5. His claim, however, is wholly speculative and entirely insufficient to meet his burden 
under rule 23B. The mere appearance of both men at any number of hearings does not 
establish collusion. The foster family's alleged use of visitation "as a tool" is equally 
insufficient to establish collusion where defendant makes no attempt to tie the conduct to Mr. 
Thompson or to his own sentencing. Defendant offers no other factual allegations to bridge 
10 
the gap, and he provides no authority for requiring that the report include this information 
or that counsel raise it at sentencing. 
Defendant's motion and docketing statement are wholly inadequate to meet rule 23B 's 
requirements as to even the first prong of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Despite his heavy burden under the rule, he offers only a general list of alleged omissions 
devoid of facts or authority. He fails to establish that any crucial information was missing 
from his PSI report, without which his counsel cannot have been deficient for failing to 
articulate the omission to the sentencing court. Neither does defendant acknowledge that 
some, if not all, of the information was otherwise presented to the sentencing court. 
Defendant provides no basis upon which a remand may be granted, and this Court should, 
accordingly, deny his motion. See State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah App. 1993) (a 
remand is not appropriate to permit a defendant to conduct a fishing expedition). 
PROPOSED ORDER 
Defendant has submitted an insufficient proposed order. He proposes that this Court 
order a remand that instructs the trial court "to hold a hearing and to make factual findings 
in a manner consistent with Appellant's motion." Order Remanding the Case to the Trial 
Court for Supplementation of the Record on Appeal and the Entry of Findings of Fact. His 
order identifies none of the requisite factual issues or ineffectiveness claims with which to 
direct the trial court's proceedings in this matter. Because of this failure, and the inadequacy 
11 
of defendant's rule 23B motion, the State does not propose any remand order in this matter. 
See Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny defendant's request for a rale 23B 
remand. 
DATED this , > / d a y of October, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KRIS 6. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Thorne. 
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a), (b) . 
Weaver has not alleged specific nonspeculative facts warranting 
remand. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
Dated this _^\ day of October, 2 007 
FOR THE COURT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael S. WEAVER, Defendant and Ap-
pellant. 
No. 20060482-CA. 
June 28, 2007. 
Second District, Farmington Department, 
051700456; The Honorable Rodney S. Page. 
Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and 
THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Michael S. Weaver appeals his sen-
tence for theft, a third degree felony. 
Weaver argues that the district court erred 
by failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report. ^  He 
also argues that his trial counsel was inef-
fective for failing to ensure that the district 
court resolved the alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report. 
Weaver argues that the district court 
erred in failing to resolve alleged inac-
curacies in the presentence investigation 
report. The State concedes that the district 
court failed to comply with Utah Code sec-
tion 77-18-l(6)(a) by not resolving the al-
leged inaccuracies on the record. SeeUtah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (Supp.2006). 
However, the State argues that Weaver was 
not prejudiced by this mistake during sen-
tencing, or alternatively, that the issue is 
moot because Weaver has already served 
his jail term. Accordingly, it requests this 
court to affirm Weaver's sentence and re-
mand solely to comply with section 
77-18-l(6)(a). 
In State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 
94 P.3d 295, we held that the district court 
erred in failing to resolve Maroney's objec-
tions to the sentencing reports, and we re-
manded to allow the court to resolve the 
objections on the record. See id. at f 31.We 
went on to state that "[i]f resolution of the 
objections affects the trial court's view of 
the appropriate sentence, the trial court 
may then revise the sentence 
accordingly.'Yd. This disposition is appro-
priate in the present case because Weaver 
alleges that he was prejudiced by the dis-
trict court's failure to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies in the report. Allowing the 
district court to revisit the sentences after 
resolving the alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report gives ap-
propriate deference to the district court's 
sentencing function. Accordingly, we re-
mand, but reject the State's request that we 
affirm the sentences prior to remand.™1 
FN1. While the State's arguments 
that Weaver was not prejudiced by 
any alleged error and that the issue 
is now moot are plausible, the re-
cord is not sufficiently clear to al-
low us to make those determina-
tions. More particularly, we do not 
know the exact nature of the alleged 
inaccuracies with the presentence 
© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 2 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 1848715 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 229 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
investigation report. Further, while 
Weaver speaks mainly to the jail 
term associated with his probation, 
it is possible that resolution of the 
inaccuracies in his presentence in-
vestigation report could have led to 
different, and more favorable, pro-
bationary terms. 
Based upon our review of the record 
and the State's concession, we remand the 
case so "the sentencing judge can consider 
the objections to the presentence report, 
make findings on the record as to whether 
the information objected to is accurate, and 
determine on the record whether that in-
formation is relevant to sentencing."State 
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT \9\ 44, 973 P.2d 404. 
After resolving the alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report, the 
district court may revise the sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Our disposition makes 
it unnecessary to consider Weaver's altern-
ative argument alleging ineffective assist-
ance of trial counsel. 
This matter is remanded to the district 
court. 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding Judge, 
and GREGORY K. ORME and WILLIAM 
A. THORNE JR., Judges, Concur. 
Utah App.,2007. 
State v. Weaver 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 1848715 
(Utah App.), 2007 UT App 229 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. , 
MICHAEL S. WEAVER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
CaseNo.20060482-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his sentence for theft, a third degree felony. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
L Should this case be remanded for the trial court to resolve on the 
record defendant's objections to his presentence investigation report? 
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the 
record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports is a question of law 
that [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, ^ f 6, 129 
P.3d 282 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 
(Utah 2006). 
II. Has defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing where he has not shown that counsel's performance 
negatively affected his sentence? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f^ 6, 
89P.3dl62. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to defendant's plea affidavit, the following facts describe his crime: 
Between December 16 and 21, 2004, defendant's automobile 
was repaired at the Big O Tire Store in Bountiful, Utah. The car was 
taken from the parking lot without the services or parts being paid 
for. The defendant was found in possession of the vehicle on 
December 29, 2004. The vehicle had tires that had been installed at 
the Big O Tire Store. The defendant has previously been convicted 
of theft in Salt Lake Third District Court. . . , theft by receiving in 
Salt Lake Third District Court,. . . and Attempted Burglary with 
intent to commit theft in Salt Lake Third District Court. . . and in 
Layton City Second District Cour t . . . . 
(R. 52, 131-32). 
2 
On March 185 2005, defendant was charged with theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (R. 1). Defendant waived his 
preliminary hearing and was bound over as charged (R. 24, 26-27, 28). 
On November 29, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to theft (R. 48-49, 51-56). In 
exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to recommend that defendant's prison 
sentence be suspended and that he be placed on probation (R. 54). As terms of that 
probation, the State would recommend that defendant pay restitution, serve a jail sentence 
"concurrent with any jail sentence imposed as a result of any conviction of cases he has 
pending in Third District Court," and "be given credit toward any jail sentence for any 
time he has served . . . as a result of the revocation of his pre-trial release on October 21, 
2005" (R. 54). The State further agreed "[t]hat upon payment of restitution the [S]tate 
will stipulate to the defendant's motion to reduce the judgment to a Class A Misdemeanor 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-3-402" (R. 54). 
Before sentencing, defendant filed a letter requesting to withdraw his plea (R. 66, 
97-98). Defendant was appointed new counsel, and a hearing on defendant's motion was 
set (R. 66). At that hearing, defendant and his prior counsel testified (R. 71-72). The trial 
court denied defendant's motion (R. 71-72). 
After denying defendant's motion, the trial court asked defense counsel wnexher he 
had received defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI) (R. 145:61). In response, 
defense counsel indicated that the 1977 murder conviction listed in the report was 
3 
"somebody else" whose name was John Wesley Weaver, not Michael S. Weaver. (R. 
145:61). Defense counsel stated that defendant was "trying to get not only this but 
several other matter[s] cleared up because they have this record overlaid with [that other 
person]" (R. 145:61). 
The trial court gave defendant ten days to file his objections to the presentence 
investigation report, and gave the State ten days to respond to defendant's objections (R. 
145:62). Nothing in the record indicates that defendant ever filed his objections with the 
court. 
At the next hearing, defense counsel provided the trial court with "some psycho 
therapy clinics that [defendant] has been attending" and "some at-a-boys for classes he 
has completed of therapy" (R. 145:64). After noting that defendant's PSI was now 
several months old, the trial court ordered that sentencing be continued so that the report 
could be updated (R. 145:64-65). 
On May 9, 2006, the trial court held a final sentencing hearing. The PSI used at 
sentencing was the same one that had been prepared several months earlier (R. 130). In 
it, defendant acknowledged a juvenile record that included property violations and a 
weapons charge (R. 133). The PSI also contained a record of defendant's adult criminal 
history, which included convictions for theft in 1974; theft in 1977; burglary and 
possession of an illegal firearm in 1977; possession of a firearm by a restricted person in 
1980; burglary in 1981; three counts of theft in 1983; three counts of burglary in 1985; 
4 
burglary in 2000, theft and possession of an illegal weapon in 2001; burglary in 2001; and 
burglary in 2002 (R. 133-35). In addition, the PSI indicated that defendant was awaiting 
sentence in Salt Lake County for possession of a controlled substance, unlawful 
possession of a credit card, and possession of another's identification card; and that 
defendant had warrants out on two counts of theft and one count of child endangerment 
(R. 135). Finally, the PSI included in defendant's criminal history a 1977 conviction for 
murder (R. 134). A parenthetical next to the listing indicated that defendant had told the 
PSI preparer that the conviction was not his (Id). 
At the hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he had reviewed the 
PSI with defendant (R. 145:67). Defense counsel responded: "It's still the one left from 
January and I did have a copy of the letter dated April 13 from Troy Grogan from AP&P" 
(R. 145:67). Without making Troy Grogan's letter a part of the record, counsel stated that 
defendant "would like to address the Court, Your Honor" (R. 145:67). 
Defendant told the court "that my pre-sentence report is still totally inaccurate. 
There's a lot of errors and discrepancies in there. All Mr. Grogan really did is write a 
memo. He didn't research anything I asked him to research" (R. 145:68). However, 
instead of addressing inaccuracies in his criminal record, defendant challenged the 
report's factual summary of his current crime (Id). The trial court interrupted defendant 
and ordered him not to "argue the case with me, Mr. Weaver. I want to know about your 
life" (Id.). 
5 
Defendant then explained that he had two young children and that, "since three 
years ago when I accepted custody of my kids, I changed my whole life. I mean, I gave 
up everything" (R. 145:68). The trial court interrupted defendant and asked, "What are 
these charges in Salt Lake County from last year? . . . If you changed your life, what are 
those doing there?" (Id). The court then referenced the charges pending at the time the 
PSI was prepared, as well as an assault and an "attempted damaging a jail" charge (R. 
145:69). Defendant responded, "Well, Your Honor, when I lost custody of my kids [when 
I was arrested for the current crime], that was the rock that held me together. . . . After 
six months, I lost myself for a minute" (R. 145:68). The court then asked defendant the 
status of the charges he had pending in Salt Lake County (R. 145:71). After hearing 
defendant's response, the court heard from the prosecutor and the victim (R. 145:72-73). 
When the court then asked defense counsel whether there was anything farther, the 
following discussion took place: 
Defco: He's just disputing the entire adult record on Page 4. 
Court: All I'm interested in, Mr. Weaver, is you've been to prison twice, 
right? 
Defendant: Your Honor, I've been to prison more than twice. 
Court: I know, at least twice, right? 
Defendant: Yes sir. 
Court: You've been paroled a couple of times and revoked? 
Defendant: Yes sir, 13 years ago. 
Court: And I note that that's been 15 years since that occurred. 
(R. 145:74-75). 
Without any further discussion of the alleged inaccuracies in defendant's PSI, the 
trial court sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term, placed him on probation, and 
ordered him to pay restitution (R. 145:75). As a condition of probation, defendant was 
ordered to serve 90 days in jail with "[n]o credit for time served" (R. 80, 95-96, 100-03). 
The court explained, "the reason I impose this sentence at this time is because of what 
you have done in the interim period since this offense occurred. Now if I were sentencing 
you on the Salt Lake matters, I'll tell you right now, you'd go right to prison but that's not 
before m e . . . . " (R. 145:77). 
On May 18, 2006, defendant filed his notice of appeal (R. 85-86). The trial court 
entered its final judgment on May 22, 2006 (R. 100-03). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him before 
resolving his objections to his PSI. Defendant contends that, absent this error, the trial 
court would not have sentenced him to 90 days in jail. Defendant, therefore, asks this 
Court to vacate his sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resolution of 
those objections and resentencing. 
7 
Under well-established law, the trial court was required to resolve defendant's 
objections to his PSI at sentencing. Because the trial court failed to do so, a remand for 
that purpose is necessary. 
However, the record clearly establishes that defendant's sentence was not based on 
any discrepancies in defendant's PSI. Moreover, any challenge to defendant's 90-day jail 
term is moot where defendant has apparently served that sentence. Consequently, this 
Court should reject defendant's request to vacate his sentence. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at 
sentencing by failing to have the trial court resolve any alleged discrepancies in his PSI 
and by failing to assert three mitigating factors. To establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show both that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's performance. 
Defendant's first claim fails because, as discussed in Point I, none of the alleged 
inaccuracies in his PSI affected defendant's sentence. Thus, defendant cannot show that 
he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, even if it were deficient. 
Defendant's second claim fails because he cannot overcome the presumption that 
counsel's decision not to argue the mitigating factors was a sound strategic one. 
Defendant had a long criminal record that spanned thirty years and included numerous 
convictions for theft. In addition, defendant had accumulated several charges, including 
an assault charge, after being charged in the present case. Against that background, any 
8 
attempt to minimize defendant's culpability in this particular case—by asserting that his 
conduct here "neither caused nor threatened serious harm" and that the offensive conduct 
in this case was "from a single episode,"—could have easily backfired, causing the court 
to focus even more on defendant's extensive criminal history of thefts and burglaries than 
it already had. More importantly, defendant received a suspended prison term and a 
probation term that required only 90 days in jail. Given his extensive criminal history, 
defendant cannot show that, absent his counsel's performance, he would have received a 
more favorable sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO RESOLVE ON THE RECORD DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 
TO HIS PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him without first "duly 
considering] the inaccuracies set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report." Aplt. 
Br. at 10. According to defendant, at sentencing, he disputed "among other things, the 
entire adult record." Id. However, the trial court "failed to duly consider the information 
or make findings on the record as to whether the information objected to . . . was 
accurate," and "failed to make the requisite determination on the record of whether the 
information was relevant to the issue at sentencing." Id. at 11. The State concedes that a 
limited remand is necessary for the trial court to resolve defendant's objections to his 
9 
adult criminal record as reported in the PSI. Defendant's sentence, however, should be 
affirmed. 
Governing law. Section 77-18-1(6) governs disputes in presentence investigation 
reports. Under that section, "[a]ny alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2004). If the parties are thereafter unable to resolve those 
inaccuracies, the trial court "shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the 
record." Id "[Compliance with this section 'requires the sentencing judge to consider 
the party's objections to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record whether that information 
is relevant to the issue of sentencing."5 State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,133, 999 P.2d 7 
(quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^  44, 973 P.2d 404); see also State v. Veteto, 2000 
UT 62, \ 14, 6 P.3d 1133; State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, % 26, 94 P.3d 295. 
A violation of section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a remand "to the trial court with 
instructions that it expressly resolve [defendant's] objections in full compliance with 
section 77-18-l(6)(a)." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 45; see also Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 
1J31. 
Few violations of section 77-18-l(6)(a), however, require vacation of defendant's 
sentence. If the alleged inaccuracies had no impact on a sentence, this Court affirms the 
10 
sentence and remands the matter "for the limited purpose of resolving [defendant's] 
objections to the presentence investigation report on the record as required by section 77-
18-l(6)(a)." Veteto, 2000 UT 62, <h 16; Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ffif 34-35 (remanding for 
findings under section 77-18-1(6) but affirming sentence); Jaegar, 1999 UT 1, U 45 
(holding that, where defendant does not claim that trial court's error "affected his 
sentence, this error does not require reversal" of defendant's sentence); State v. Toles, 
2006 UT App 359U (memorandum decision) (per curiam) (affirming sentence where, 
"[fjrom all that appears in the record, the alleged inaccuracies had no effect on the court's 
determination that prison was the appropriate sentence"); State v. Villalobos, 2000 UT 
App 354U (memorandum decision) (affirming sentence where disputed facts "would not 
affect [defendant's] sentence"). 
Even if defendant challenges his sentence and the record is unclear as to whether 
the alleged inaccuracies affected it, this Court still does not vacate the sentence. Rather, 
this Court remands the matter to the trial court to "resolve [defendant's] objections on the 
record," and directs the court that, "[i]f resolution of the objections affects the trial court's 
view of the appropriate sentence, the trial court may . . . revise the sentence accordingly." 
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \3\\see also State v. Reddish, 2006 UT App 376U, * 1 
(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (same); State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 476U, *1 
(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (same). 
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Analysis. In this case, the trial court did not resolve defendant's objections as 
required under section 77-18-l(6)(a) (R. 145:68-77). Consequently, this Court should 
remand the matter for the trial court to resolve those objections. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-l(6)(a); Veteto, 2000 UT 62,116; Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ffif 34-35; Jaeger, 1999 UT 
1,145; Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, ^ 31. 
This Court should not, however, vacate defendant's sentence. First, defendant 
makes no showing that the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI affected his sentence. See 
Aplt. Br. at 9-11. Nor can he. 
Defendant contends that, before the trial court, he disputed "among other things, 
the entire adult record." Aplt. Br. at 10. However, to the extent the trial court considered 
defendant's prior record at sentencing, the court expressly confirmed with defendant the 
accuracy of those parts of his record which it found relevant. Thus, the court confirmed 
with defendant that "you've been to prison [at least] twice, right?" (R. 145:74-75). The 
court also confirmed with defendant that "[y]ou've been paroled a couple of times and 
revoked?" (Id.). And, the court confirmed that defendant committed additional crimes 
even after he had committed the present offense (R. 145:68-69). Finally, in explaining 
the basis for its lenient sentence, the trial court did not reference defendant's prior 
criminal record; rather, the court explained, "[t]he reason I impose this sentence at this 
time is because of what you have done in the interim period since this offense occurred" 
(R. 145:77). 
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Given this record, defendant cannot show that the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI 
affected his sentence. Cf. Toles, 2006 UT App 359U (affirming sentence where "[fjrom 
all that appears in the record, the alleged inaccuracies had no effect on the court's 
determination that prison was the appropriate sentence"); Villalobos, 2000 UT App 354U 
(affirming sentence where disputed facts "would not affect [defendant's] sentence"). 
Second, even if the alleged inaccuracies did adversely affect his sentence, the only 
part of his sentence which defendant claims was affected was his jail term, a condition of 
his probation. According to defendant, absent the alleged inaccuracies in his PSI, "the 
court arguably would have simply imposed probation," without the "90 days jail time." 
Aplt. Br. at 15 (discussing prejudice in connection with his ineffective assistance claim). 
However, the trial court imposed sentence on defendant on May 9, 2006, and 
ordered defendant to begin serving that jail term immediately. Nothing in the record 
suggests that defendant requested a stay of execution of the jail term pending appeal. 
Consequently, defendant has long served that part of his sentence which he asserts was 
affected by the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI. Any challenge to that part of his sentence 
is, therefore, moot. See State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986) ("[H]owever 
questionable the procedures employed in entering the formal order of sentence, the matter 
is now moot since defendant has served his sentence and has received a formal 
termination of probation."); Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981) (holding that 
challenge to sentence was moot "where it can be shown that no adverse collateral 
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consequences will follow a failure to rule on a . . . challenge to a sentence now served"); 
Salt Lake City v. Woitock, 1999 UT App 341U, *1 (memorandum decision) (per curiam) 
(holding that challenge to sentence on class B misdemeanor was moot where defendant 
"did not seek a stay of his sentence pending this appeal"). 
In sum, the trial court's failure to resolve on the record defendant's objections to 
his PSI requires that this case be remanded to the trial court only for that limited purpose. 
The trial court's failure does not require vacation of defendant's sentence. 
II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING, WHERE HE HAS 
NOT SHOWN THAT COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE NEGATIVELY 
AFFECTED HIS SENTENCE 
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. 
Defendant asserts, first, that counsel performed deficiently by "fail[ing] to investigate the 
inaccuracies in the PSI" or to ask the trial court to "utilize its fact finding function to 
resolve [them]." Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendant asserts, second, that counsel performed 
deficiently by "fail[ing] to argue various mitigating circumstances." Id. at 14. Defendant 
argues that, absent counsel's deficient performance, "the court arguably would have 
simply imposed probation," without also imposing "90 days jail time." Id. at 15. 
A. Governing law. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both 
that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgement," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
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prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, If 19,12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
To establish the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must "rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 19 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). To establish the second prong, defendant must affirmatively show that 
absent counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
result. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (holding that claim of prejudice 
must be "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter") (citation and quotation 
marks omitted); State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). 
In both instances, "defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. "The necessary consequence of this burden is that an 
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. at f^ 17. "Where 
the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Id. 
Finally, "it is not necessary for [this Court] 'to address both components of the 
[Strickland] inquiry if [defendant] makes an insufficient showing on one.'" Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also 
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State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, \ 9, 90 P.3d 644. Thus, "[w]hen it is 'easier to 
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,'5' this 
Court "will do so without addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally 
reasonable." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also 
Wright, 2004 UT App 102, lj 9. 
B. Defense counsel's failure to object to inaccuracies in PSI. 
Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by 
failing to address alleged inaccuracies in his PSI, including the "aggravating 
circumstances listed in the PSI." Aplt. Br. at 13-14. However, as demonstrated in Point I, 
none of the alleged inaccuracies in defendant's PSI affected his sentence. See pp. 12-13, 
supra. Thus, even if defense counsel performed deficiently by not adequately addressing 
the alleged inaccuracies, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's performance. 
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim therefore fails. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19; 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50; Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441; Parsons, 871 P.2d at 523; Wright, 
2004 UT App 102,1(9. 
C. Defense counsel's failure to assert mitigating circumstances. 
Defendant claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by 
"failpng] to argue various mitigating circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 14. Specifically, 
defendant claims that counsel should have argued as mitigating factors that his "'criminal 
conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm,'" that "'[t]here were substantial 
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grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though failing to establish a defense,'" and 
that "the offensive conduct was 'from a single criminal episode.5" Aplt. Br. at 14-15 
(quoting R. 143, p.2). 
Defendant, however, presents no evidence indicating that "there were substantial 
grounds to excuse or justify [his] criminal behavior" in this case. See Aplt. Br. at 14 
(quoting R. 143). Thus, defendant cannot rely on that mitigating factor to support his 
ineffective assistance claim. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17 (holding that "[w]here the 
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.") 
Second, defendant fails to "rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances," counsel's decision not to raise the other two mitigating factors "might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ f 19 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). According to his PSI, defendant's criminal history spans some 
thirty years and includes numerous convictions on theft and burglary charges (R. 133-35). 
In addition, defendant confirmed at sentencing that he had a pending assault charge (R. 
145:69). 
Against that backdrop, any assertion that defendant should be shown leniency in 
this particular case because his "'criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious 
harm'" or because "the offensive conduct was 'from a single crimmal episode'"—even 
though defendant's record revealed a long history of single criminal episodes—would 
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have rung hollow at best. At worst, it would have drawn the court's attention back to 
defendant's long criminal history, his apparent unwillingness to learn from his prior 
criminal penalties, and the PSPs recommendation that defendant be sentenced to prison 
based on that history (R. 130-31). Under such circumstances, defense counsel may have 
reasonably concluded that assertion of the mitigating factors was as likely to hurt 
defendant as to help him. Counsel's decision not to pursue them, therefore, may certainly 
"be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f^ 19 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, even if defendant could show that his counsel rendered deficient 
performance in not asserting these mitigating factors, defendant has not shown that he 
was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Defendant's only contention is that, absent 
counsel's errors, "the court arguably would have simply imposed probation," without also 
imposing "90 days jail time." Aplt. Br. at 15. The record at sentencing, however, makes 
clear that the trial court's sentencing decision was primarily based on defendant's 
criminal history, not on the nature of the current offense (R. 145:74-75, 77). Thus, 
defendant's contention that, absent counsel's alleged deficiency, he would have received 
any more lenient sentence than the one he actually received, is pure speculation. See 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 (holding that claim of prejudice must be "demonstrable reality 
and not a speculative matter") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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In sum, defendant's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at 
sentencing fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
sentence and to remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of resolving 
defendant's objections to his PSI in compliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED j£_ April 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Su-
pervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms 
and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension— 
Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, Chapter 
2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or 
offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in 
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court 
is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services 
shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct 
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the 
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with 
department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for 
the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or informa-
tion from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement accord-
ing to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the victim 
and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
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(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's 
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for 
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may 
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall 
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information 
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record 
and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on 
probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(in) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a' county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensa-
tory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed 
on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in 
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 
77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and 
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, 
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer respon-
sibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay 
should not be treated as contempt of court 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination 
of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerat-
ed at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revoca-
tion of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance 
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the 
conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine 
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause 
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented^ 
by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the 
court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previous-
ly imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition 
of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or 
his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records 
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report Except for 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section,_ the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department 
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report 
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall 
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance 
with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(li) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitor-
ing only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
directly or by contract with a private provider. 
